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Channel 4 News reveals legal advice on Iraq War
Published: 04/27/05
By: Channel 4 News
Channel 4 News has obtained a copy of the summary of the confidential legal advice written by the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith and sent to the Prime Minister on March 7th, two weeks before the war with Iraq.
The document reveals that Lord Goldsmith warned Mr Blair that failure to secure a second United Nations resolution explicitly authorising military action would force the government 'urgently' to reconsider its legal case.
Resolution 1441 had been passed in November 2002
and gave Iraq 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations'.
A copy of the summary is below.
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SUMMARY EXTRACT
Read the extract from Lord Goldsmith's summary:
"26. To sum up, the language of resolution 1441 leaves the
position unclear and the statements made on adoption of the
resolution suggest that there were differences of view within the
Council as to the legal effect of the resolution. Arguments can be
made on both sides. A key question is whether there is in truth a
need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a
failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure
fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis
of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that
situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow
textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment
is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue.
Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
27. In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the
safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further
resolution to authorise the use of force. [...] The key point is
that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq
has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution
1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
28. Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the
negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments
of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept
that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable
in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a
further resolution.
29. However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived
the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be
sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding
that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other
words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of
non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the
resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be
highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest
reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider very carefully
whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non- compliance by
Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that
Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
30. In reaching my conclusion, I have taken
account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions,
including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and
Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on
the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the
action under international law was no more than reasonably
arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if
the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the
court would agree with the view.
I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and
considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the
statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well
conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do requ1re a further Council decision
in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But
equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably
maintained.
However, it must be recognised that on previous occasions when
military action was taken on the basis of a reasonably arguable
case, the degree of public and Parliamentary scrutiny of the legal
issue was nothing as great as it is today.
31. The analysis set out above applies whether a second resolution
fails to be adopted because of a lack of votes or because it is
vetoed. As I have said before, I do not believe that there is any
basis in law for arguing that there is an implied condition of
reasonableness which can be read into the power of veto conferred
on the permanent members of the Security Council by the UN
Charter.
So there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable
veto" would entitle us to proceed on the basis of a presumed
Security Council authorisation. In any event, if the majority of
world opinion remains opposed to military action, it is likely to
be difficult on the facts to categorise a French veto as
"unreasonable". The legal analysis may, however, be
affected by the course of events over the next week or so, eg the
discussions on the draft second resolution.
If we fail to achieve the adoption of a second resolution we would
need to consider urgently at that stage the strength of our legal
case in the light of circumstances at the time."
DOWNLOADS
Alternatively, you can download the documents in various formats
below.
Microsoft
Word file (27kb)
Textpad
file - 5kb
Scanned
version, page 1. - 103 kb Scanned
version, page 2. - 102 kb Scanned
version, page 3. - 69 kb
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