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Condi committed to regime change in early 2002
06/13/05 - - The following, is purported to be written by Blair foreign policy advisor David Manning, indicates that now-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was committed to "regime change" in early 2002. It also outlines some problems a postwar Iraq might face.
The document is presented as transcribed by
"Raw Story"
SECRET – STRICTLY PERSONAL
FROM: DAVID MANNING DATE: 14 MARCH 2002
CC: JONATHAN POWELL
PRIME MINISTER
YOUR TRIP TO THE US
I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with
her and an NSC team on Wednesday (to which Christopher Meyer also
came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank when we
were one-on-one at dinner. I attach the records in case you want
to glance.
IRAQ
We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush
is grateful for your support and has registered that you are
getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for
regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a
public opinion that was very different than anything in the
States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if
we need pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and
produce the right result. Failure was not an option.
Condi’s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there
were some signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of the
practical difficulties and political risks. (See the attached
piece by Seymour Hersh which Christopher Meyer says gives a pretty
accurate picture of the uncertain state of the debate in
Washington.)
From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big
questions:
-
how to persuade international opinion that military action
against Iraq is necessary and justified;
-
what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition;
-
how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with
internal opposition (assuming there is any);
-
what happens on the morning after?
Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear
whether he can expect coalition support. I told Condi that we
realized that the Administration could go it alone if it chose.
But if it wanted company, it would have to take account of the
concerns of its potential coalition partners. In particular:
-
the Un dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must
be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider
opinion that the US was conscious of the international
framework, and the insistence of many countries on the need
for a legal base. Renwed refused by Saddam to accept
unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument;
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the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine.
Unless we did, we could find ourselves bombing Iraq and losing
the Gulf.
YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH
No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks
with Condi convinced me that Bush wants to hear you views on Iraq
before taking decisions. [sic] He also wants your support. He is
still smarting from the comments by other European leaders on his
Iraq policy.
This gives you real influence: on the public relations
strategy; on the UN and weapons inspections; and on US planning
for any military campaign. This could be critically important. I
think there is a real risk that the Administration underestimates
the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn’t an option,
but this really does not mean that they will avoid it.
Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by
Kurds and Shias? Will Americans really put in enough ground troops
to do the job if the Kurdish/Shi’ite stratagem fails? Even if
they do will they be willing to take the sort of casualties that
the Republican Guard may inflict on them if it turns out to be an
urban war, and Iraqi troops don’t conveniently collapse in a
heap as Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to
answer these and other tough questions, in a more convincing way
than they have so far before concluding that they can do the
business.
The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push
Bush on the Middle East. The Iraq factor means that there may
never be a better opportunityto [sic] get this Administration to
give sustained attention to reviving the MEPP.
DAVID MANNING
See also - Bombshell
As Six More British Documents Leaked
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