Evidence
of false statements made by Tony Blair to Parliament and the
media
Leaked
Cabinet Office papers, September 2004:
Summary
The
Butler Report of July 2004 highlighted substantial omissions of
evidence regarding Iraq, but did not argue that positively false
information had been given by the Prime Minister to press or
Parliament. On 18 September 2004, the Daily Telegraph
published extracts from a series of newly leaked documents from
the Cabinet Office. With one exception, none of these were
quoted in the Butler Report.
The full texts of these documents:
A)
Provide clear evidence that the Prime Minister
substantively misled Parliament and press in claiming that:
a.
his government’s objective was disarmament, and not
regime change by force; and that
b.
as late as February 2003, no decision had been taken to
invade Iraq.
Instead,
they show that Blair was fully committed to regime change as
early as 8 March 2002, and communicated this position to Bush
and his officials. This is substantive evidence of positive
falsehood on the part of the Prime Minister, not simply an
omission of evidence.
B)
Demonstrate
that a new Security Council Resolution in 2002 and renewed
inspections were designed to provide a trigger for war,
as part of an explicitly set-out sequence of actions by the
US/UK to provide political and legal support for invasion. Claims
by the Prime Minister and others that it was only Saddam’s
unwillingness to cooperate with renewed inspections that led to
war were therefore misleading. These policy documents clearly
show an intention to use (and arguably abuse) the UN route to
provide a legal pretext for pre-decided regime change, not as a
route to peaceful disarmament.
C)
Show that as early as March 2002 the Prime Minister was
advised that
a.
intelligence on Iraqi weapons was “poor”;
b.
containment had been “partially successful”,
preventing Iraq’s resumption of a nuclear programme and
restricting chemical and biological weapons development;
c.
Iraq’s security threat was not increasing;
d.
as such
“current intelligence is insufficiently robust” to meet the
criteria of proof required for legal justification of invasion.
The
Prime Minister’s decision, taken at least as early as March
2002, to commit to regime change by force, was thus taken
against the background of advice that the threat from Iraq was
NOT increasing; containment was judged to be “partially
successful”; and that without Iraq’s renewed rejection of
weapons inspections, such a course of action would, on available
evidence, not gain legal sanction under the UN Charter.
In
addition, the documents demonstrate the scale of the misgivings
expressed by the Prime Minister’s advisors to him and his
ministers around the time that he committed to assisting regime
change. The Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, and the Foreign
Secretary advised that:
a.
the invasion of Iraq could not guarantee a WMD-free Iraq;
b.
the invasion of Iraq could not guarantee a democratic
Iraq;
c.
neither the US nor the UK had credible plans for the
aftermath of regime change;
d.
the opposition groups relied upon so heavily before and
after invasion were regarded by most Iraqis as “Western
stooges”.
Contrary
to recent assertions by the Prime Minister that at that time
“the idea that we did not have a plan for afterwards is simply
not correct”, the
documents show that when the Prime Minister took the decision to
support military regime change in March 2002, his officials
warned him precisely that “none has satisfactorily answered
how that regime change is to be secured”, and that “Bush has
yet to find the answers to the big questions …[of] what
happens on the morning after”.
Facsimiles
of these documents can be seen at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9125.htm
If
you have any comments, please contact:
Michael
Lewis
Christ’s
College
St
Andrew’s Street
Cambridge
CB2 3BU
Analysis
A)
The
Prime Minister’s concealment of his agreement to pursue regime
change
1. Two
Downing Street memos from mid-March 2002, marked ‘Secret’,
describe meetings between David Manning (then the Prime
Minister's foreign policy adviser and current UK ambassador to
Washington) and Christopher Meyer (then UK ambassador to
Washington), and senior members of the US administration. Both
describe promises made to the US about the UK’s support for
regime change.
I
said [to Condoleezza Rice] you [Blair] would not budge in your
support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a
Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than
anything in the States.
On
Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you
used with Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the
plan had to be clever and failure was not an option.
2.
Contrary to his frequent public denials, therefore (see below),
twelve months before war with Iraq, and eight months before
UNSCR1441, the Prime Minister committed the UK to pursuing
regime change.
3. That
the UK envisaged that regime change might involve invasion,
rather than an internal coup or the assassination of Saddam
Hussein, is made clear by a further document, marked
‘Secret’ and entitled ‘Iraq: Options Paper’, produced on
8 March 2002 by the Overseas and Defence Secretariat of the
Cabinet Office. It states that “[s]ince 1991, our objective
has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not
possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international
community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein
in power.”
The document considers three options for regime change: covert
support for opposition groups to mount an uprising or coup; air
support for opposition groups; and a full-scale ground campaign.
4.
Although it suggests that the first two might be tried as
preludes to the third, it concludes that:
“[i]n
sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of
overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we
can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the
international community.”
5.
Although this document is a policy options paper rather than a
formal commitment, it insists that a decision had to be taken
relatively soon: “All options have lead times. If an invasion
is contemplated this autumn, then a decision will need to be
taken in principle six months in advance.”
In fact, Blair’s commitment to regime change in March 2002
demonstrates that such a decision preceded even this military
timetable.
6.
Contrary to this evidence, the Prime Minister and other
ministers repeatedly denied throughout 2002 and early 2003 that
a decision had been taken to commit to regime change, and
insisted that if Saddam complied with the inspectors, he would
be allowed to remain in power.
7.
In an
interview on 14 November 2002, Blair insisted that:
So
far as our objective, it is disarmament, not regime change -
that is our objective. Now I happen to believe the regime of
Saddam is a very brutal and repressive regime, I think it does
enormous damage to the Iraqi people....but on the other hand I
have got no doubt either that the purpose of our challenge from
the United Nations is disarmament of weapons of mass
destruction, it is not regime change.
8.
In his monthly press conference on 13 January 2003, Blair said:
Of
course no-one wants conflict, everyone would prefer this to be
resolved peacefully.
9.
In his monthly press conference on 18 February 2003, Blair again
insisted:
There
is no inexorable decision to go to war but there is an
inexorable decision to disarm Saddam Hussein. How that happens
is up to Saddam….when we went to the UN last November, that
was America taking the decision that if Saddam co-operated that
disarmament would happen peacefully, without war and without
regime change.
10.
In the House of Commons on 25 February 2003, Blair continued to
insist, contrary to his commitment to regime change, that Saddam
could remain in power if he cooperated with weapons inspections:
even
now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary
disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most
people do - but even now, he could save it by complying with the
UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to
achieve disarmament peacefully.
11.
Given the evidence of a policy decision taken to pursue regime
change as early as March 2002, these statements could only be
true if government policy changed from supporting regime change
up to March 2002, to supporting disarmament between mid-2002 and
February 2003; and returned to support for regime change in
March 2003. Blair needs to demonstrate that this ostensibly
unlikely scenario was indeed the case: if not, then these
statements clearly show that he misled media and Parliament.
B)
UNSCR
1441 and the inspection regime designed to provide a trigger for
war, as part of an explicitly set out sequence of actions by the
US/UK to provide political and legal support for invasion
12. In
his memo on lunch with Paul Wolfowitz, Christopher Meyer
reported to Downing Street that:
“I
then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the
inspectors and the UN SCRs”
12.
This suggests that renewed inspections, provided by a new UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) in November 2002, were intended
to make Saddam default, providing a justification for a
pre-planned war.
13.
This is supported by the “Iraq: Options Paper” of 8 March,
which establishes that renewed inspections and UNSCRs are part
of a process explicitly designed to provide a pretext for war:
A
legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law
Officers advice, none currently exists. This makes moving
quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore
consider a staged approach, establishing international support,
building up pressure on Saddam, and developing military plans.
There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.
….
34. To launch such a [ground] campaign would require a
staged approach:
*
winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam
through tougher containment….A refusal to readmit UN
inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely
frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by the
Security Council could provide the justification for military
action.
*
careful [military] planning….
*
coalition building: diplomacy….
*
incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with
regard to Iraq’s territorial integrity.
*
tackling other regional issues [including the Middle East Peace
Plan]
*
sensitising the public: a media campaign to warn of the dangers
that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK
and abroad.
14.
The paper thus explicitly establishes that the UN/weapons
inspector route was designed, contrary to the assertions of the
Prime Minister (cf. paras. 7-10), to lead to invasion, not to
peaceful disarmament.
15. A
timescale is also suggested:
Sufficient
air assets would need three months and ground forces at least
four-five months to assemble so on logistical grounds a ground
campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to
start action are early spring
16. Yet
in his 18 February press conference, Blair denied that a
timetable had been considered:
QUESTION:
I just want to come back to this point about timing. Once Hans
Blix reports on the 28th [February], how long does
the Security Council have realistically to secure a second
resolution after that? Is the request from the French of 14
March a realistic request to come back and discuss things then?
PRIME
MINISTER: The reason I hesitate about setting timelines or
making dates of some sort of defining significance is because if
I do so I am doing something where decisions really have not
been taken, and it depends frankly what happens over the next
period of time.
C)
Advice
on Iraq’s weapons, the uncertainty of intelligence, and the
lack of legal justification for offensive military action
Iraq’s weapons and intelligence
17. The
September leaks strengthen many of the findings of the Butler
Inquiry that the Prime Minister was advised that (a)
Intelligence on Iraqi weapons was “poor”; (b) there was no
new or imminent threat from Iraq’s weapons capability or
intentions which might justify a change in policy.
18. The
‘Iraq: Options Paper’, quoted in the Butler inquiry’s
report states that:
As
at [sic] least worst option, we have supported a policy of
containment [since 1991] which has been partially successful.
However: Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD, although
our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past
and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though
there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam
will use WMD.
Although
it thus argues that Iraq continues to have a WMD capability, it
suggests that its threat is not increasing:
Since
1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful:
*
Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
*
Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal
to pre-Gulf War levels;
*
ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
*
Biological Weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes
have been hindered;
*
No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have
given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although
subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain
autonomous; and
*
Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.
19.
In a letter marked “Confidential and Personal” to Jack Straw
on 22 September 2002, written to provide “thoughts for your
[Jack Straw’s] personal note to the Prime Minister”, Peter
Ricketts, the Political Director of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, reiterated the view that nothing had changed which might
justify new efforts at disarmament:
THE
THREAT: The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of
Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them
post-11 September….even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD
programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the
nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts: the programmes are extremely
worrying but have not, as far as we know, been stepped up.
20. The
Prime Minister was definitely made aware of this view,
passed on in a letter by Jack Straw on 25 March 2002:
WHAT
IS WORSE NOW?
4.
If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US
would now be considering military action against Iraq. In
addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with
UBL [Usama Bin Laden] and Al Qaida. Objectively the threat from
Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September.
Legal justification for offensive military action
21.
Given the current lack of evidence for an imminent threat, the
‘Iraq: Options Paper’ of March 2002 clearly argues that
there is currently unlikely to be legal justification for an
invasion:
30.
Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be
[legally] justified if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf
War ceasefire resolution, 687….
31.
As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687,
it is for the [UN Security] Council to decide whether a breach
of obligations has occurred….
32.
For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that
Iraq was in breach of 687:
they
would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its
obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof
would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current
intelligence is insufficiently robust to meet this criterion.
22.
Although the Butler Report has shown that Joint Intelligence
Committee reports seen by the Prime Minister did harden their
language about Iraq’s weapons between March and September 2002
(partly from intelligence which was subsequently withdrawn as
unreliable), the Prime Minister, as we have seen, took the
decision to remove Saddam in March 2002: when, according to
advice given to him, the threat from Iraq was NOT increasing;
containment was judged to be “partially successful”; and
there was insufficient evidence as yet to legally justify
military action.
23.
Unless British policy changed from regime change to disarmament
between 2002 and 2003, and back again in March 2003 (for which
there is no evidence), then these papers indicate that British
participation in the UN process between 2002 and 2003 was
intended to provide a legal justification for regime change, not
to pursue disarmament peacefully.
D)
Advice
that the invasion of Iraq might not produce a WMD-free Iraq, nor
a democratic one; and that post-war planning, and even broad
objectives, were inadequate
Post-war
planning and outcomes
25.
While Iraqi democracy is the clearly preferred outcome in the
“Iraq: Options Paper” of March 2002, the paper is
astonishingly unconfident that regime change will result either
in Iraqi democracy or in long-term disarmament. The document
even considers the UK accommodating the emergence of a “Sunni
strongman” instead; and it stresses that neither democracy nor
‘strongman’ can guarantee a WMD-free Iraq:
The
US administration has lost faith in containment and is now
considering regime change. The end states could either be a
Sunni strongman or a representative government.
….
11.
In considering the options for regime change below, we need to
first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two
possibilities:
*
A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi
territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and
political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on
abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights,
particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries
could withdraw quickly. However, there would be a strong risk of
the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed
coup until an autocratic Sunni dictator emerged who protected
Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or
*
A representative, broadly democratic government….Such a regime
would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours.
However, to survive it would require the US and others to commit
to nation-building for many years.….
27.
But it should be noted that even a representative government
could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces,
so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional
armouries.
26. In
addition to these misgivings, Blair’s advisors also made it
clear in March 2002 that they did not believe that the US had
produced a convincing plan for Iraq’s replacement government
and reconstruction. David Manning, describing his meeting with
Condoleezza Rice, wrote:
From
what she [Condoleezza Rice] said, Bush has yet to find the
answers to the big questions:…what happens on the morning
after?
27. In
a letter to the Prime Minister of 25 March 2002 marked ‘Secret
and Personal’, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was even less
sanguine about the lack of both US and UK planning, and likely
outcomes:
We also have to answer the big
question – what will this action achieve? There seems to be a
larger hole on this than on anything. Most of the assessments
from the US have assumed regime change as a means of eliminating
Iraq’s WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how
that regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any
certainty that the replacement regime will be better.
11.
Iraq has NO history of democracy so no-one has this habit or
experience.
28.
Blair denied the absence of planning when these documents were
made public, on 18 September 2004:
And
so the idea that we did not have a plan for afterwards is simply
not correct. We did, and indeed we have unfolded that plan
Yet
given the timing of decision-making revealed by these documents,
they show that when the Prime Minister took the decision to
support military regime change in March 2002, his officials
warned him precisely that “none has satisfactorily answered
how that regime change is to be secured”, and that “Bush has
yet to find the answers to the big questions …[of] what
happens on the morning after”.
They show that the decision to remove Saddam Hussein was
taken well before any plans for his replacement had been
produced – arguably an extremely reckless sequence of
decision-making.
External Iraqi opposition groups
29. A
major part of the UK/US pursuit of post-Saddam democracy was to
give substantial public support throughout 2002 and 2003 to
external Iraqi opposition groups. Yet the “Iraq: Options
Paper” of 8 March 2002 had warned ministers that external
Iraqi opposition groups were unlikely to provide credible
members of successor regimes:
The
external [Iraqi] opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic
credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi National
Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmed Chalabi, a
Shia and convicted fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other
major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), espouses moderate
Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi….Most
Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.
30.
Despite being told by UK advisors that they did not have any
popular legitimacy, considerable weight was given by both the UK
and the US governments to these groups in forming the
post-Saddam regime. On 14 April 2003, Blair assured the House of
Commons that:
In
relation to the coalition and Iraqi
opposition
groups, I hope that some of the conspiracy theories about people
simply being parachuted in to take over the country can be laid
to rest. What is important is that, in the end, the legitimacy
of anyone—from inside or outside Iraq—will rest on their
support from the Iraqi
people themselves.
31. Yet
on May 22 2003, in response to a question asking what
government’s “policy is on the involvement of Mr. Ahmed
Chalabi in the post-war government in Iraq”,
Foreign
Office Minister Mike O’Brien wrote that:
Chalabi
is a prominent opposition figure. It is therefore only
appropriate that the group he represents should be able to play
a role in Iraq's future. But that role is for the people of Iraq
to determine.
[Ahmed
Chalabi was subsequently appointed by the US/UK-led Coalition
Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Governing Council on 13 July
2003.]
32. On
20 July 2004, Blair told the House of Commons that:
If
people read the letter from Dr. Allawi,
published only the other day, they will see that he set out the
authentic voice of Iraq and its future—what Iraq can now
become.
[Ayad
Allawi, leader of the INA, was appointed Interim Prime Minister
of Iraq on 28 May 2003.]