The Defector’s Secrets
by John Barry
Published in the March 3, 2003 issue of Newsweek
Magazine
03/03/03 "Newsweek" - - Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein’s inner circle, told CIA and British intelligence officers and U.N. inspectors in the summer of 1995 that after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them.
KAMEL WAS SADDAM Hussein’s son-in-law and had direct knowledge
of what he claimed: for 10 years he had run Iraq’s nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile programs. Kamel told his Western
interrogators that he hoped his revelations would trigger
Saddam’s overthrow. But after six months in exile in Jordan,
Kamel realized the United States would not support his dream of
becoming Iraq’s ruler after Saddam’s demise. He chose to
return to Iraq—where he was promptly killed.
Kamel’s revelations about the destruction of Iraq’s WMD
stocks were hushed up by the U.N. inspectors, sources say, for two
reasons. Saddam did not know how much Kamel had revealed, and the
inspectors hoped to bluff Saddam into disclosing still more. And
Iraq has never shown the documentation to support Kamel’s story.
Still, the defector’s tale raises questions about whether the
WMD stockpiles attributed to Iraq still exist.
Kamel said Iraq had not abandoned its WMD ambitions. The stocks
had been destroyed to hide the programs from the U.N. inspectors,
but Iraq had retained the design and engineering details of these
weapons. Kamel talked of hidden blueprints, computer disks,
microfiches and even missile-warhead molds. “People who work in
MIC [Iraq’s Military Industrial Commission, which oversaw the
country’s WMD programs] were asked to take documents to their
houses,” he said. Why preserve this technical material? Said
Kamel: “It is the first step to return to production” after
U.N. inspections wind down.
Kamel was interrogated in separate sessions by the CIA,
Britain’s M.I.6 and a trio from the United Nations, led by the
inspection team’s head, Rolf Ekeus. NEWSWEEK has obtained the
notes of Kamel’s U.N. debrief, and verified that the document is
authentic. NEWSWEEK has also learned that Kamel told the same
story to the CIA and M.I.6. (The CIA did not respond to a request
for comment.)
The notes of the U.N. interrogation—a three-hour stretch one
August evening in 1995— show that Kamel was a gold mine of
information. He had a good memory and, piece by piece, he laid out
the main personnel, sites and progress of each WMD program. Kamel
was a manager—not a scientist or engineer—and, sources say,
some of his technical assertions were later found to be faulty. (A
military aide who defected with Kamel was apparently a more
reliable source of tech-nical data. This aide backed Kamel’s
assertions about the destruction of WMD stocks.) But, overall,
Kamel’s information was “almost embarrass-ing, it was so
extensive,” Ekeus recalled—including the fact that Ekeus’s
own Arabic translator, a Syrian, was, according to Kamel, an Iraqi
agent who had been reporting to Kamel himself all along.
Published in the March 3, 2003 issue of Newsweek
Magazine
© 2003 Newsweek, Inc.
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