This
is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office legal advice
appended as Annex A to the Cabinet Office briefing
paper on Iraq of July 21, 2002. This advice was
originally written in March 2002.
The following is a transcript rather than the
original document in order to protect the source.
To see Cabinet Office briefing paper: click
here;
To see original Downing Street memo:
click
here
CONFIDENTIAL
IRAQ
:
LEGAL BACKGROUND
(i)
Use of Force:
(a) Security Council Resolutions
(b) Self-defence
(c) Humanitarian
Intervention
(ii)
No Fly Zones
(iii)
Security Council Resolutions relevant to the
sanctions regime
(iv)
Security Council Resolutions relevant to
UNMOVIC
(I)Use
of Force: (a) Security Council Resolutions relevant
to the Authorisation of the Use of Force
1.
Following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the
Security Council authorised the use of force against
Iraq in resolution 678(1990); this resolution
authorised coalition forces to use all necessary
means to force Iraq to withdraw, and to restore
international peace and security in the area. This
resolution gave a legal basis for Operation Desert
Storm, which was brought to an end by the cease-fire
set out by the Council in resolution 687 (1991). The
conditions for the cease-fire in that resolution
(and subsequent resolutions) imposed obligations on
Iraq
with regard to the elimination
of WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution
687 (1991) suspended but did not terminate the
authority to use force in resolution 678 (1990).
2.
In the
UK
’s view a violation of
Iraq
’s obligations which undermines
the basis of the cease-fire in resolution 687 (1991)
can revive the authorisation to use force in
resolution 678 (1990). As the cease-fire was
proclaimed by the Council in resolution 687 (1991),
it is for the Council to assess whether any such
breach of those obligations has occurred. The
US
have a rather different view:
they maintain that the assessment of breach is for
individual member states. We are not aware of any
other state which supports this view.
3.
The authorisation to use force contained in
resolution 678(1990) has been revived in this way on
certain occasions. For example, when
Iraq
refused to cooperate with the UN
Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1997/8, a series of
SCRs condemned the decision as unacceptable. In
resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned
Iraq
’s decision to end all
co-operations with UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of
Iraq
’s obligations under resolution
687 (1991), and restated that the effective
operation of UNSCOM was essential for the
implementation of that Resolution. In our view these
resolutions had the effect of causing the
authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1991)
to revive, which provided a legal basis for
Operation Desert Fox. In a letter to the President
of the Security Council in 1998 we stated that the
objective of that operation was to seek compliance
by Iraq with the obligations laid down by the
Council, that the operation was undertaken only when
it became apparent that there was no other way of
achieving compliance by Iraq, and that the action
was limited to what was necessary to secure this
objective.
4.
The more difficult issue is whether we are still
able to rely on the same legal base for the use of
force more than three years after the adoption of
resolution 1205 (1998). Military action in 1998 (and
on previous occasions) followed on from specific
decisions of the Council; there has now not been any
significant decision by the Council since 1998. Our
interpretation of resolution 1205 was controversial
anyway; many of our partners did not think the legal
basis was sufficient as the authority to use force
was not explicit. Reliance on it now would be
unlikely to receive any support.
Use
of Force: (b) Self-Defence
5
The conditions that have to be met for the
exercise of the right of self-defence are
well-known:
i)
There must be an armed attack upon a state or such
and attack must be imminent;
ii)
The use of force must be necessary and other means
to reverse/avert the attack must be unavailable;
iii)
The acts in self-defence must be proportionate and
strictly confined to the object of stopping the
attack.
iv)
The right of self-defence may only be exercised
until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to ensure international peace and security
and anything done in exercise of the right of self-defence
must be immediately reported to the council.
6.
For the exercise of the right to self-defence there
must be more than “a threat”. There has to be an
armed attack actual or imminent. The development or
possession of nuclear weapons does not in itself
amount to an armed attack; what would be needed
would be clear evidence of an imminent attack.
During the Cold War, there was certainly a threat in
the sense that various states had nuclear weapons
which they might, at short notice unleash upon each
other. But that did not mean the mere possession of
nuclear weapons, or indeed their possession in time
of high tension or attempt to obtain them, was
sufficient to justify pre-emptive action. And when
Israel
attacked an Iraqi nuclear
reactor, near
Baghdad
, on 7 June 1981 it was
“strongly condemned” by the Security Council
(acting unanimously) as a “military attack in
clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and the norms of international conduct.”
Use
of Force: (c) Humanitarian Intervention
7.
In the
UK
view, the use of force may be
justified if the action is taken to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. The limits to
this highly contentious doctrine are not clearly
defined, but we would maintain that the catastrophe
must be clear and well-documented, that there must
be no other means short of the use of force which
could prevent it, and that the measures taken must
be proportionate. This doctrine partly underlies the
very limited action taken by allied aircraft to
patrol the No Fly zones in
Iraq
(following action by Saddam to
repress the Kurds and the Shia in the early 90s),
which involves occasional and limited use of force
by those aircraft in self-defence. The application
of this doctrine depends on the circumstances at any
given time, but it is clearly exceptional.
(ii)
No Fly Zones (NFZs)
8.
The NFZs over Northern and
Southern Iraq
are not established by UN
Security Council Resolutions. They were established
in 1991 and 1992 on the basis that they were
necessary and proportionate steps taken to prevent a
humanitarian crisis. Prior to the establishment of
the
Northern NFZ
the Security Council had adopted
resolution 688 (1991) on 5 April 1991 in which the
Council stated that it was gravely concerned by the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish
populated areas, which had led to a massive refugee
flow, and that it was deeply disturbed by the
magnitude of the human suffering involved. The
resolution condemned that repression of the Iraqi
civilian population and demanded that
Iraq
immediately end the repression.
In our view, the purpose of the NFZs is to monitor
Iraqi compliance with the provisions of resolution
688.
UK
and
US
aircraft patrolling the NFZs are
entitled to use force in self-defence where such a
use of force is a necessary and proportionate
response to actual or imminent attack from Iraqi
ground systems.
9.
The US have on occasion claimed that the purpose of
the NFZs is to enforce Iraqi compliance with
resolutions 687 or 688. This view is not consistent
with resolution
687,
which does not deal with the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population, or with resolution 688, which
was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
and
does
not contain any provision for enforcement. Nor (as
it is sometimes claimed) were the current NFZs
provided for in the Safwan agreement, a provisional
agreement between coalition and Iraqi military
commanders of 3 March 1991, laying down military
conditions for the cease-fire which did not contain
any reference to the NFZs.
(iii)
Security Council Resolutions relevant to the
sanctions regime
10.
The sanctions regime against Iraq was established by
resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August
1990, which, following the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq, decides that all states
shall prevent the import into their
territories of any commodities originating in Iraq,
the sale or supply to Iraq of any commodities other
than medical supplies, and, in humanitarian
circumstances, food stuffs, and that Iraqi funds and
financial resources
should be frozen. Resolution 661 remains in
force. The major exception to the sanctions regime
is the oil for food programme, which was established
by resolution 988 (1995) and permits oil exports (in
unlimited amounts following resolution 1284 (1999))
by Iraq on condition that the purchase price is paid
into an escrow account established by the UN
Secretary-General, and the funds in that account are
used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the export of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs and materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs. The escrow account is also
used to fund the UN Compensation Commission and to
meet the operating costs of the UN, including those
of UNMOVIC (see below).
11.
The oil for food programme is renewed by the
Security Council at (usually) 6 Monthly intervals,
most recently by resolutions 1382 (2001) of 29
November 2001. Under that resolution the Council
also decided that it would adopt, by 13 May 2002,
procedures which would improve the flow of goods to
Iraq
, other than arms and other
potential dual use goods on a Good Review List. The
US
are currently reviewing the
final details of the list with the Russians.
12.
In resolution 687 (1991) the Council decided that
the prohibition against the import of goods from
Iraq should have no further force when Iraq has
completed all the actions contemplated in paragraphs
8-13 of that resolution concerning Iraq’s WMD
Programme.
Iraq
has still not complied with this
condition. Under paragraph 21 of resolution 687, the
council decided to review the prohibition against
the supply of commodities to
Iraq
every 60 days in the light of
the policies and practices of the Iraqi government,
including the implementation of all the relevant
resolutions of the Council, for the purpose of
determining whether to reduce or lift them. These
regular reviews are currently suspended as a result
of Iraqi non-compliance with the Council’s
demands.
13.
The intention of the Council to act in accordance
with resolution 687 on the termination of these
prohibitions has been regularly reaffirmed,
including in resolution 1284 (1999). Paragraph 33 of
that resolution also contains a complex formula for
the suspension of economic sanctions against Iraq
for renewable periods of 120 days, if UNMOVIC and
the IAEA report cooperation in all respects by Iraq
in fulfilling work programmes with those bodies for
a period of 120 days after a reinforced system of
monitoring and verification in Iraq becomes fully
operational.
Iraq
has never complied with these
conditions.
(iv)
Security Council Resolutions relating to UNMOVIC
14.
UNMOVIC was established by resolution 1284 (1999) to
replace the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
established under resolution 687 (1991) (the
ceasefire resolution). UNMOVIC is to undertake the
responsibilities of the former Special Commission
under resolution 687 relating to the destruction of
Iraqi CBW and ballistic missiles with a range of
over 150 kilometres and the on-going monitoring and
verification of Iraq’s compliance with these
obligations. Like the Special Commission, UNMOVIC is
to be allowed unconditional access to all Iraqi
facilities, equipment and records as well as to
Iraqi officials. Under paragraph 7 of resolution
1284 UNMOVIC and the IAEA were given the
responsibility of drawing up a work programme which
would include the implementation of a reinforced
system of ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV)
and key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed
by Iraq, which constitute the governing standard of
Iraqi compliance. There are currently no UNMOVIC
personnel in Iraq, and the reinforced OMV system has
not been implemented, because of Iraq’s refusal to
cooperate.
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