

# Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy

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INTRODUCTION.....	2
I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS .....	4
II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY.....	6
Underlying Strategic Concepts.....	6
Planning for Uncertainty .....	6
Shaping the Future Security Environment .....	7
Strategic Depth.....	8
Continued U. S. Leadership .....	8
Enduring Requirements.....	9
Alliances.....	9
High Quality Personnel .....	10
Technological Superiority .....	10
Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy.....	11
Strategic Deterrence and Defense .....	11
Forward Presence .....	13
Crisis Response .....	14
Reconstitution.....	16
Translating the Elements into Forces and Programs.....	16
III. REGIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES .....	18
Europe .....	18
East Asia/Pacific .....	20
The Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia.....	21
Latin America and the Caribbean.....	22
Sub-Saharan Africa .....	23
CONCLUSION .....	24

## INTRODUCTION

The past four years have seen extraordinary changes abroad as the Cold War drew to a close. We have entered a new strategic era. The collapse of the Soviet Union -- the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence -- fundamentally altered, but did not eliminate, the challenges ahead. The integration of the leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security, and the prospects of expanding that system, significantly enhance our international position and provide a crucial legacy for future peace. Our national strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to one on regional challenges and opportunities. We have moved from Containment to the new Regional Defense Strategy.

The changes made over the past four years have set the nation on a solid path to secure and extend the opportunities and hopes of this new era. America and its allies now have an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. Where once a European-wide war, potentially leading to nuclear exchange, was perhaps only a few weeks and miles away, today such a threat has fallen back and would take years to rekindle. With the end of the Cold War, there are no global threats and no significant hostile alliances. We have a marked lead in critical areas of warfare. Our alliances, built during our struggle of Containment, are one of the great sources of our strength in this new era. They represent a democratic "zone of peace," a community of democratic nations bound together by a web of political, economic, and security ties. This zone of peace offers a framework for security not through competitive rivalries in arms, but through cooperative approaches and collective security institutions. The combination of these trends has given our nation and our alliances great depth for our strategic position.

Simply put, it is the intent of the new Regional Defense Strategy to enable the U.S. to lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this strategic depth won at such great pains. This will require us to strengthen our alliances and to extend the zone of peace to include the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as these now-fragile states succeed in their struggle to build free societies and free markets out of the ruin of Communism. Together with our allies, we must preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to our interests and otherwise work to build an international environment conducive to our values. Yet, even as we hope to increasingly rely on collective approaches to solve international problems, we recognize that a collective effort will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. Where the stakes so merit, we must have forces ready to protect our critical interests.

Our fundamental strategic position and choices as a nation are thus very different from those we have faced in the past. The choices ahead of us will reset the nation's direction for the next century. We have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. But as we do so, we must be guided by a strategy that recognizes that our domestic life cannot flourish if we are beset by foreign crises. We must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape an uncertain future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

Guided by the new strategy, we are restructuring our forces to meet the essential demands of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. As we do so, we are reducing our forces significantly -- by more than a million military and civilian personnel. These reductions will reduce force structure to its lowest level in terms of manpower since before the Korean War and spending to the lowest percentage of GNP since before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet even as we reduce our forces in size overall, we must not carelessly destroy their quality or their technological superiority. Along with alliances, high-quality personnel and technological superiority represent capabilities that would take decades to restore if foolishly lost in this time of reductions.

Even in this time of downsizing, we must retain capable military forces. For the world remains unpredictable and well-armed causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We have sought through the Regional Defense Strategy to anticipate challenges and opportunities yet to come, to shape a future of continued progress, and to preclude reversals or the emergence of new threats. This document

discusses the new strategy in some depth and is intended as a contribution to a national dialogue that very much needs to continue as we look to protecting the nation's interests in the 1990s, and beyond.

## I. DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

The national security interests of the United States are enduring: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

These national security interests can be translated into four mutually supportive strategic goals that guide our overall defense efforts:

- Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source, against the United States, its citizens and forces, and to honor our historic and treaty commitments.
- The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, avoids the renationalization of security policies, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our Regional Defense Strategy.
- The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the United States and our allies. These regions include Europe, East Asia, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Consolidated, nondemocratic control of the resources of such a critical region could generate a significant threat to our security.
- The fourth goal is to help preclude conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and to limit violence should conflict occur. Within the broader national security policy of encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic government and open economic systems, the Defense Department furthers these ends through efforts to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, and other threats to internal democratic order, assistance to peacekeeping efforts; the provision of humanitarian and security assistance; limits on the spread of militarily significant technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them; and the use of defense-to-defense contacts to assist in strengthening civil-military institutions and encourage reductions in the economic burden of military spending.

To reach these goals, the United States must show the leadership necessary to encourage sustained cooperation among major democratic powers. The alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends dependent upon individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive, or ineffective. We also must encourage and assist Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states of the former Soviet Union in establishing democratic political systems and free markets so they too can join the democratic "zone of peace."

But while we favor collective action to respond to threats and challenges in this new era, a collective response will not always be timely and, in the absence of U.S. leadership, may not gel. While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from our own. Where our allies' interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we must maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests. Such capabilities are essential to our ability to lead, and should international support prove sluggish or inadequate, to act independently, as necessary, to protect our critical interests. History suggests that effective multilateral action is most likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.

We cannot lead if we fail to maintain the high quality of our forces as we reduce and restructure them. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our

interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace that avoids breaking the force or sending misleading signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors. An effective ability to reconstitute our forces is important as well, since it signals that no potential rival could quickly or easily gain a predominant military position.

At the end of World War I, and again to a lesser extent at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order achieved in substantial part through American sacrifice and leadership could be sustained without our leadership and significant American forces. Today, a great challenge has passed; but other threats endure, and new ones will arise. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to meet future challenges and to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower cost.

## II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We have shifted our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Soviet Union to a focus on the regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future. At the same time, we can work to shape the future environment in ways that would help preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also help to preclude the emergence of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past. Precluding regional threats and challenges can strengthen the underpinnings of a peaceful democratic order in which nations are able to pursue their legitimate interests without fear of military domination.

In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. But the world remains unpredictable and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests. Such a vacuum could make countries there feel vulnerable, which in turn could lead to excessive military capabilities and an unsteady balance of one against another. If we do stand back it will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation for which we hope.

### **Underlying Strategic Concepts**

The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit force. However, decisions today about the size and characteristics of the forces we are building for tomorrow can influence whether threats to our interests emerge and, if they do emerge, whether we are able to defeat them decisively. Four concepts illustrate this relationship.

#### **Planning for Uncertainty**

An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict political alignments and military capabilities weakens as we look farther into the future.

Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade or more ago. Much of the capability that we are eliminating now cannot be restored quickly, and precipitous cuts would do long-lasting damage, even to the capabilities that we retain.

Thus, we must reduce and reshape our forces not only to respond to the near-term threats that we can measure clearly today, or even to the trends most likely to continue. We also must hedge against the emergence of unexpected threats, the reversal of favorable trends, or even fundamental changes in the nature of our challenges. Risk can never be entirely eliminated. The limits on our ability to predict the future must be recognized, and flexibility to reduce the consequences of being wrong must be built into even our current forces and programs.

We are building defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain, given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities five, ten or fifteen years from now to counter threats or pursue

interests that cannot be defined with precision today. While we can safely reduce force structure and the pace of modernization, we must retain the ability to protect our interests and, by so doing, to help deter unwanted reversals.

## Shaping the Future Security Environment

America cannot base its future security on a shaky record of prediction or even on a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks as well to help shape the future. Our strategy is designed to preclude threats and to encourage trends that advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is not simply within our means; it is critical to our future security.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military power, we and our allies molded a world in which Communism was forced to confront its contradictions. Even as we and our allies carried the defense burden required in the Cold War, democracy was able to develop and flourish.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty years of effort. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations so that they can become a force for peace, democracy, and freedom not only in Europe but also in other critical regions of the world.

Cooperative defense arrangements enhance security, while reducing the defense burden for everyone. In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the United States at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential development of a new global threat.

Maintaining highly capable forces also is critical to sustaining the U.S. leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that our significant military power threatens no one's aspirations for peaceful democratic progress.

Our forces also can shape the future environment by performing the "nontraditional" roles of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Generally such situations are of international concern, and we would expect to be part of a commensurate multinational effort; however, U.S. leadership may be crucial to catalyze such action, and we may have unique capabilities that would appropriately complement others' forces.

Our ability to shape the future rests not only on our efforts to keep closed the door to aggression and military intimidation; it rests also on our ability to provide the example necessary for others to take positive, reciprocal steps. The President's nuclear initiatives of the fall and winter of 1991-92 induced the former Soviet Union to take positive reciprocating steps that will help reduce the remaining threat posed by nuclear forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. These initiatives made possible the U.S.-Russian agreements of June 1992 and subsequent signing of the START II treaty in January 1993. Similarly, NATO's new strategy not only reflects an adjustment to the reduced threat environment in Europe but equally it reassures our former adversaries of the truly defensive nature of the NATO alliance. Through such initiatives we can solidify the gains achieved through START, START II and CEE and go beyond them.

Our ability to reduce sources of regional instability and to limit violence should conflict occur also is critical to shaping the environment. This includes, for example, updating our strategy to counter the

proliferation of militarily significant technology, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with the means to deliver them. Our traditional export control efforts must not only be updated and strengthened in this new era, but supplemented by political dissuasion, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and inspection and destruction missions, as illustrated in the case of Iraq.

## **Strategic Depth**

America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no challenger to peaceful democratic order similar to that posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inter-German border, first receded hundreds of miles east and has since been transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation.

Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but our strategic position has improved in regional contexts as well. For the near-term, we and our allies possess sufficient capabilities to counter threats in critical regions. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts, and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won great depth for our strategic position.

In this regard, it is important to reflect in our strategy the fact that the international system is no longer characterized by Cold War bipolarity. The Cold War required the United States and its allies to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. Developments in even remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefore often required a U.S. response. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine in light of the new defense strategy whether and to what extent particular challenges engage our interests. These changes and the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining the extent to which U.S. forces must be committed to safeguard shared interests.

The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence, Saddam struggles to retain control in Iraq, Iraq's dangerous military has been greatly damaged, our ties with moderate states are stronger, energy resources are secure, and significant progress has been made in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic measures and others such as peacekeeping operations, security assistance, defense-to-defense contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance, as well as security measures to prevent the emergence of a nondemocratic aggressor in critical regions. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading democracy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new, antagonistic global threat or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure this strategic depth or those that would be required if we lost it.

## **Continued U. S. Leadership**

U.S. leadership, essential for the successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieving our long-term goals in this new era. The United States continues to prefer to address hostile, nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However, sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for otherwise protecting our interests.

Recognition that the United States is capable of opposing regional aggression will be an important factor in inducing nations to work together to stabilize crises and resist or defeat aggression. For most countries, a general interest in international stability and security will not be enough to induce



them to put themselves at risk simply in the hope that others will join them. Only a nation that is strong enough to act decisively can provide the leadership needed to encourage others to resist aggression. Collective security failed in the 1930s because no strong power was willing to provide the leadership behind which less powerful countries could rally against Fascism. It worked in the Gulf because the

United States was willing and able to provide that leadership. Thus, even when a broad potential coalition exists, leadership will be necessary to realize it.

The perceived capability -- which depends upon the actual ability -- of the United States to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor even in those cases where we do not actually use it. It will not always be incumbent upon us to assume a leadership role. In some cases, we will promote the assumption of leadership by others, such as the United Nations or regional organizations. In the end, there is no contradiction between U.S. leadership and multilateral action; history shows precisely that U.S. leadership is the necessary prerequisite for effective international action. We will, therefore, not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. A future President will need options allowing him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act independently to protect our critical interests.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Five years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to maintain needed forces. And we paid dearly for our error.

## **Enduring Requirements**

The new defense strategy with its regional focus reflects the need to pay special attention to three enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represents key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

## **Alliances**

Our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents a "silent victory" of building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. Defense cooperation among the democracies has not only deterred external threats, it has provided an environment in which we and our allies have peacefully developed and prospered. The United States will maintain and nurture its friendships and alliances in Europe, East Asia/Pacific, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end, including reductions in U.S. military forces stationed overseas, particularly as our friends and allies are able to assume greater responsibilities. There will remain, however, a significant role for U.S. forward presence, including stationed forces, and changes must be managed carefully to ensure that reductions are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment. In addition, certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others. Specific issues concerning alliances and coalitions are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges."

## High Quality Personnel

Our victory in the Gulf War demonstrated impressively the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly trained, highly motivated all-volunteer total force we have worked so hard to build is the key to maintaining our future military leadership and capabilities. We also require high-quality career civilians, especially in the managerial, scientific and technical fields. Our challenge for the future is to preserve the high-quality active, reserve, and civilian force we have worked so hard to build.

The Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and realistic training supplemented by advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We also must provide the quality of life they and their families deserve, including keeping the amount of time military units are deployed away from home at reasonable levels.

High-quality personnel require outstanding military leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected such leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They also must be given the opportunity and encouragement to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems.

Identifying the core military competencies that will be most important in the future will be among the highest priorities of our military leadership. New equipment is not sufficient. Innovation in its use also is necessary. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a nation must continually develop and evolve in the ongoing military-technological revolution. Future challenges will require the continued mastery of critical areas of warfare, but we also require mastery of evolving capabilities, perhaps replacing some that are critical today. An essential task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's challenges while making hard decisions about capabilities we need no longer emphasize.

## Technological Superiority

The onset of a new military-technological revolution presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this revolution, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information gathering and processing, precision strike, and other key technologies. Our investment in innovation must be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

We must maintain superiority in key areas of technology. It is critical, therefore, that we identify the highest leverage technologies and pursue those with vigor. U.S. forces must retain a decisive lead in those technologies critical on future battlefields. To provide such high quality forces for tomorrow, we must, in the first instance, maintain a robust science and technology program, balanced between a core of broad sustaining programs and selected "thrusts" that contribute directly to high priority needs. This must be complemented by technology safeguards and export control regimes targeted, in coordination with our friends and allies, on particular proliferation concerns.

Robust science and technology alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems that are provided in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the technology testing process. Through simulation, we can investigate before we buy new weapons or systems how well they may perform on the battlefield. In addition, we must encourage new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment. This will be increasingly important over time.

All of this, however, does not mean we will move rapidly into large-scale production of numerous new weapons systems. We will be procuring less because our armed forces will be smaller, and because the need for modernization is reduced with the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, time and production pressures created by Soviet weapons developments resulted in a defense acquisition process geared to early production of new systems, often without as thorough a prior development as desired. Science and technology can be a much more important factor in the overall acquisition process -- doing more than before to "prove out" new technology and components before programs enter the formal acquisition process. These concepts provide the basis for a new acquisition approach. Nevertheless,

development of new technologies and their incorporation into weapons systems through a more efficient acquisition process will be essential to provide the advantages smaller forces will need to deter or prevail in future conflicts.

## **Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy**

The Regional Defense Strategy seeks to protect American interests and to shape a more stable and democratic world. It does so by adopting a regional focus for our efforts to strengthen cooperative defense arrangements with friendly states and to preclude hostile, nondemocratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us. In this way also the strategy aims to raise a further barrier to the rise of any serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The Regional Defense Strategy rests on four essential elements:

- Strategic Deterrence and Defense — a credible strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.
- Forward Presence — forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers in regions critical to us.
- Crisis Response -- forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.
- Reconstitution -- the capability to create additional new forces to hedge against any renewed global threat.

## **Strategic Deterrence and Defense**

Even though the risk of a massive strategic nuclear attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack must remain the highest defense priority of the nation. It is the one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and should continue to change, to account for the welcome developments in states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, survivable and flexible U.S. strategic nuclear forces still are essential to deter use of the modern nuclear forces that will exist in the former Soviet Union even after START and START II reductions have been implemented. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat emerging.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have eliminated the threat of massive Soviet aggression launched from the former East Germany that required heavy reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons for deterrence. This permits us to move into a new era in nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's nuclear initiatives in 1991 and 1992, which made major changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces designed to enhance stability while eliminating weapons, to further reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation, and to encourage corresponding reductions in the nuclear posture of the former Soviet Union.

The leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have stated their readiness to eliminate strategic offensive forces, while Russia is significantly reducing its force levels. (These four new states of the former Soviet Union are the only ones with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. Russian authorities assure us that all tactical weapons are now on Russian territory.) They recognize the United States is not a threat and rightly view strategic forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We have been working with these leaders to provide financial and technical assistance to reduce and dismantle these nuclear forces. We already have some programs underway to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and the prevention of their proliferation. We should actively seek additional ways to further these ends.

Both the U.S. and Russia have now agreed in START II to even more dramatic changes to their nuclear deterrent forces that will significantly enhance stability. For us these include, in addition to

reductions to START levels, fewer intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with the remaining ICBMs having only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers will be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads will be roughly half of what we planned to have under START.

As we reduce the size of our offensive nuclear forces, we must ensure the survivability -- and therefore the essential stability -- of our strategic deterrent. This will limit reductions in the overall number of strategic platforms. Our planning also should take account of the greatly reduced likelihood of a deliberate massive attack in the present international situation and consider the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack.

A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be one of our major goals. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that these new states might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces also will continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the United States has extended over our allies has helped deter attack successfully for four decades. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and the threat of nuclear proliferation, despite our best efforts, persists. Other countries -- some of them, like Iraq, especially hostile and irresponsible -- threaten to acquire nuclear weapons. Some countries are also pursuing other highly-destructive systems, such as chemical and biological weapons. These developments require us to be able to deter use of such weapons, and to improve our defense capabilities.

The threats posed by instability in nuclear weapons states and by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles have grown considerably. The threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch may increase significantly through this decade. The new technology embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like extended deterrence provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of extended protection for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act, we have sought to move toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles who may not be deterred by offensive forces alone. It is this vision that is reflected in our commitment to developing a Global Protection System (GPS) not only with traditional friends and allies but also with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Deployment of defenses against limited strikes also should continue to be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles. (Further discussion of weapons of mass destruction issues is found in the Crisis Response section.)

The strategic command, control and communications system should continue to evolve toward a joint global structure, ensuring that its capabilities and survivability remain appropriate to the evolving threat and the smaller forces it will support. We also should take advantage of the potential of our strategic C31 investments to support conventional crisis response.

A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be one of our major goals. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that these new states might revert to closed,

authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces also will continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the United States has extended over our allies has helped deter attack successfully for four decades. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and the threat of nuclear proliferation, despite our best efforts, persists. Other countries -- some of them, like Iraq, especially hostile and irresponsible -- threaten to acquire nuclear weapons. Some countries are also pursuing other highly-destructive systems, such as chemical and biological weapons. These developments require us to be able to deter use of such weapons, and to improve our defense capabilities.

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The strategic command, control and communications system should continue to evolve toward a joint global structure, ensuring that its capabilities and survivability remain appropriate to the evolving threat and the smaller forces it will support. We also should take advantage of the potential of our strategic C3I investments to support conventional crisis response.

In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a survivable nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed force modernization and upgrades. These deterrent forces need to be complemented with early introduction of ballistic missile defenses against limited strikes.

## **Forward Presence**

Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition. The roles that forward presence plays in specific regions under the Regional Defense Strategy are treated in detail in Part III, "Regional Goals and Challenges."

While we are prudently reducing the levels of our presence very substantially, it is increasingly important to emphasize our intent to retain adequate presence. We should plan to continue a wide range

of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits of forces. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into critical regions.

Forward bases and access agreements must become more flexible as the security environment evolves. But they must remain oriented toward providing visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to crises large and small. Forward bases are critical to successfully implementing our strategy at reduced force levels.

In regions of the world where we lack a land-based presence, maritime forces (including afloat prepositioned equipment), long-range aviation, and other contingency forces allow us to exert presence and underscore our commitment to friends and allies, and, when necessary, aid our response to crises. Exercises, occasional deployments, prepositioning, defense exchanges and visits build trust, cooperation and common operating procedures between militaries. Important, too, are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment or projection of forces when necessary.

Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf War, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters. In addition, through forward presence, we can prosecute the war on drugs; provide humanitarian and security assistance and support for peacekeeping operations; evacuate U.S. citizens in danger abroad; and advance defense-to-defense contacts to strengthen democratic reforms.

Forward presence is a crucial element of the new regional strategy, and a major factor in overall conventional (including special operations) force size. Generally forces for forward presence (including associated CONUS-based forces for rotation) must be predominantly in the active components. As we reduce force structure to base force levels, each military department must seek innovative ways to continue providing the crucial benefits of forward presence -- both political and operational -- with acceptable impact on the smaller force. This calls for exploring new ways of operating forces in peacetime. Areas to consider include increasing the use of periodic visits of forces, possibly both active and reserve, for training or exercises; innovative manning or maintenance practices; additional overseas homeporting; combined planning; and security and humanitarian assistance.

Precipitous reductions in forward presence may unsettle security relations. Where forward bases are involved, due attention must be paid to minimizing the impact of dislocations on military families. Planned reductions should be undertaken deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

## **Crisis Response**

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the Regional Defense Strategy. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including forcible entry forces, remain key means of precluding challengers, of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges, and of achieving decisive results if the use of force is necessary.

During the Cold War, Americans understood that national survival was at stake and that a long, drawn-out and costly war could result. In regional conflicts, our stake may seem less apparent. We should provide forces with capabilities that minimize the need to trade American lives with tyrants and aggressors who do not care about their own people. Thus, our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the high-quality personnel and technological edge to win quickly and with minimum casualties. A decisive force will not always be a large-scale force; sometimes a measured military action can contain or preclude a crisis, or otherwise obviate a much larger, more costly operation. But when we

choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly and effectively. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms, matching our strengths against their weaknesses.

Consequently, crisis response requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities, particularly emphasizing high readiness forces sufficient to enable response to short-warning contingencies; sufficient munitions and spares; adequate intelligence capabilities; enhanced mobility to enable us to deploy sizable forces long distances on short notice; and a number of specific enhancements growing out of lessons learned from the Gulf War.

Our strategy further recognizes that when the United States is engaged, perhaps in concert with others, in a substantial regional crisis or is committed to a more prolonged operation, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to exploit our preoccupation. Under these circumstances, our forces must remain able to deter or to respond rapidly to other crises or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation, also on short notice.

The short notice that may characterize many regional crises requires highly responsive military forces. Required military personnel will be maintained in that component of the Total Force -- active or reserve -- in which they can most effectively, including with minimum casualties, and most economically accomplish required missions. This generally requires forces for forward presence (including associated COWS-based forces for rotation) and combat forces and initial support forces for crisis response to be predominantly in the active components. Reserve components will fulfill vital contingency roles, primarily including mobility and selected critical support for initially deploying forces; increasing increments of support for continuing and expanding deployments; and increasing increments of combat capability as well, especially for large, protracted and/or concurrent contingencies.

The crisis response element of the strategy also has important implications for our inter- and intra-theater mobility posture. Our crisis response forces will be drawn largely from COWS, or possibly from forward deployed locations in other theaters. Our mobility posture must be able to supplement forward presence forces quickly and provide the bulk of necessary combat power and support.

Future regional conflicts will be complicated by increases in both the conventional and unconventional capabilities of potential adversaries. During the Gulf War we had to prepare to handle an adversary holding chemical weapons and biological agents. We remain concerned that a number of potentially hostile nations are working to develop nuclear or other unconventional weapons. The threat of regional adversaries introducing nuclear weapons would greatly complicate future regional crises. As we learned from our experience with Iraq, it can be extremely difficult to know how far such efforts have progressed. Even relatively old technology, which in fact will characterize the vast majority of cases, can represent a tremendous challenge, as demonstrated by the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the Gulf War.

The global diffusion of conventional military and dual-use technologies will enable a growing number of countries to field highly capable conventional weapons systems, such as stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines, modern command and control systems, and even space-based assets. Third World countries attempting to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of economic distress in the former Soviet Union. We have worked multilaterally to strengthen international regimes intended to halt the diffusion of these weapons and technologies, and bilaterally to stop unauthorized leakage.

U.S. forces must be capable of operating against adversaries who possess weapons of mass destruction. Active defenses (including existing theater missile defense assets and future assets for global protection against limited strikes), passive defenses (including detection capabilities, more effective vehicle crew-compartment protective systems, and vaccines), and specialized intelligence will be needed. If the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to win even more quickly and decisively, and we would still want to retain the advantages necessary to keep our own losses as low as possible. (Further discussion of WMID issues is found in the Strategic Deterrence and Defense section.)

The Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should continue to guide future crisis response planning. The Department should selectively focus investment on the following high-priority areas: rapidly deployable anti-armor capabilities; enhanced combat abilities to identify friendly forces and thus reduce casualties from misdirected friendly fire; improved naval and land mine and countermine capabilities; defenses against chemical and biological weapons and agents; defenses against tactical ballistic and

cruise missiles; improved capabilities for precision air strikes; improved integration and flexibility of tactical command, control, communications and intelligence; and improved national-level intelligence. More generally, the Department also should apply the relevant lessons of the Gulf War identified in the Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War and other subsequent reports. A complete understanding of the war and its implications for U.S. forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

Finally, we must be prepared for crises and contingencies stemming from low-intensity conflict, which includes terrorism, insurgency, and subversion. In response to these threats to our interests, we must be prepared to undertake smaller-scale operations that require forces using specialized skills, equipment, or approaches. Such operations include non-combatant evacuations, peacekeeping missions, hostage rescues, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

## **Reconstitution**

With the demise of the Cold War, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy, therefore, prudently reduces spending and accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat in order to refocus reduced defense resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the enduring requirements of our strategy.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has made it much less likely that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come — at least for the balance of this decade. Even if, for example, some future Russian leadership were to adopt strategic aims threatening a global challenge similar to that presented by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, current estimates are that such force reconstitution efforts would allow several years or more of U.S. /allied response time, and could only happen after an authoritarian reversal and systemic realignment itself spanning several years.

Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new global threat or some emergent alliance of hostile, nondemocratic regional powers. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of a global threat contrary to the interests of the United States. Should such a threat begin to emerge, we would use the available lead time to forestall or counter it at the lowest possible levels of militarization. Our reconstitution strategy seeks to provide sufficient capability to create additional new forces and capabilities to deter and defend our interests as necessary, drawing on “regeneration” assets (cadre-type units and stored equipment), industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

Reconstitution should use low-cost assets to provide an inexpensive hedge. As we draw down the force, Cold War investments present opportunities for “smart lay-away” of long-lead elements of force structure or production capability that offer a high-leverage reconstitution hedge at quite modest cost, or might become useful to a friendly nation facing a major threat.

Measures planned and used for response to early indications of a specific reconstitution threat must strike a careful balance between, on the one hand, the needs to demonstrate resolve, strengthen deterrence, and begin enhancing military capabilities, and, on the other hand, the imperative to avoid provocative steps and to maintain the ability to arrest or reverse our steps without creating military vulnerabilities.

## **Translating the Elements into Forces and Programs.**

Our forces and programs have been designed and sized as a coherent whole to support the elements of our new regional defense strategy, carefully weighing present and future challenges. The restructuring needed to support our new strategy also calls for a shift from program planners’ traditional four “pillars” of military capability (readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure) to six pillars. We have divided the modernization pillar, distinguishing science and technology from systems acquisition, to make explicit the higher relative priority of science and technology in this new era. We have designated infrastructure and overhead as a new pillar, to explicitly focus on the need for cuts in overhead in this time of major cuts in fighting capability.



Accordingly, we have adopted these relative priorities among the new six “pillars” of defense resources:

- Readiness
- Force Structure
- Sustainability
- Science and Technology
- Systems Acquisition
- Infrastructure and Overhead

Specifically, it is of utmost importance to maintain forces of high readiness and adequate size. Of lower but still high priority is the sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional conflicts. The new strategy also gives high priority to selected science and technology to keep our qualitative edge in systems and in doctrine. By contrast, a profound slowing in former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on systems acquisition, and a fundamentally new approach to overall defense acquisition. Finally, the Department must vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead, continuing the vigorous pursuit of savings initiated under the Defense Management Review. This relative priority among the new “six pillars” aims to reduce our cost of doing business and direct our shrinking resources to ensuring very high quality, ready forces and rigorous technical and doctrinal innovation.

### III. REGIONAL GOALS AND CHALLENGES

We can take advantage of the Cold War's end and the dissolution of the Soviet Union to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges. The future of events in major regions remains uncertain. Regional and local actors may pursue hostile agendas through direct confrontation or through such indirect means as subversion and terrorism. The new defense strategy, with its focus on regional matters, seeks to shape this uncertain future and position us to retain the capabilities needed to protect our interests. With this focus we should work with our friends and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical interests and to shape a more secure international environment conducive to our democratic ideals.

#### **Europe**

We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer starkly divided between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and the Western Alliance. We have made great strides toward a Europe "whole and free." We are striving to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the former Soviet empire's successor states do not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and economic reform.

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by cooperation as articulated in the Washington Charter signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in June of 1992. But we must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of the new democracies -- that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of such dramatic change. History has demonstrated that our own security is inseparably linked to that of Europe. It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security affairs, even as we work increasingly with the other institutions emerging in Europe.

Our common security and European stability can be enhanced by the further development of a network of interlocking institutions that, in conjunction with NATO, constitute the emerging security architecture of Europe. We should work within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and with the European Community (EC) and the Western European Union (WEU) to promote security and stability. Emerging frameworks of regional cooperation also will be important.

Even as European institutions grow, we need to strengthen Alliance cohesion, and to develop new common understandings of how the Alliance can respond collectively to future challenges. Our European friends and allies should be encouraged to assume a greater share of the burden in maintaining world order and protecting common interests worldwide. Important security interests are at stake for both the Europeans and for us in many areas, including notably Eastern Europe, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, including North Africa.

In June 1992, the North Atlantic Council of NATO agreed to support CSCE peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis. In the former Yugoslavia, NATO has deployed its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to assist with UN sanctions, while NATO AWACS are helping to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO defense ministers in December 1992 agreed to refine NATO's capability for such peacekeeping operations. They announced that support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping should be included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters and tasked their permanent representatives to identify specific measures to enhance NATO's peacekeeping capabilities.

As NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO's integrated military command structure. While U.S. forces will continue to be stationed on the continent and contiguous maritime areas, the new threat environment will enable us to reduce their number, and they may, in part, play more specialized roles. But our objective should be to preserve a substantial level of U.S. forces in Western Europe with sufficient organic combat and support capabilities to maintain the viability of the Alliance; promote peaceful

progress in Europe; permit the timely reinforcement of Europe should there be a reemergence of a significant threat; and support out-of-area contingencies. The peaceful defense-to-defense contacts between our forces in Europe and the militaries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union also can be a force for peace.

To retain meaningful operational capabilities, our objective for U.S. ground forces in Western Europe should be a capable corps. We can also reduce our tactical fighter wing presence by half or more. We have eliminated ground-based nuclear forces in Europe and withdrawn U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at sea, but U.S. dual-capable aircraft and their nuclear weapons remain based in Europe; this preserves the alliance's historic emphasis on extended deterrence. These reductions translate to a presence of less than half the level of our forces at the beginning of the decade. NATO itself has adapted, through a new strategic concept that proposes smaller and multinational forces with increased mobility and an emphasis on crisis management. As U.S. forces stationed in Europe become smaller, they must remain capable of responding to crises throughout and outside of the region.

The end of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of democratic states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. It is critical to U.S. interests in Europe and those of our allies that we assist the new democracies in Eastern Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions, establish free market economies and safeguard their national independence. Regional security challenges work to divert their efforts from these ends and endanger their progress. The continued ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other states of Eastern Europe would be the surest counter to concerns raised by the long history of conflict in the region.

Security and democratization in the former Eastern Bloc also would be enhanced by mutual cooperation among the Eastern Europeans as well as with the United States, NATO and other Western Allies. NATO can assist the Eastern Europeans in reevaluating their defense postures. We must increase our defense-to-defense contacts with countries of both the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. These contacts should strive to underscore to the military leaders of these new democracies the importance of civilian control of the military through the institutions of democratic government. We also must assist the Eastern Europeans in reforming their military institutions as they institute new national defense doctrines to replace the offensive posture associated with the Warsaw Pact.

The United States has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation within and peaceful relations among Russia, Ukraine, and other new states of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states would be the best possible outcome. If democracy matures in Russia and Ukraine there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict.

Our increasing defense-to-defense contacts with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states should support the peaceful resolution of differences among them and help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations through the institutions of democratic government, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures. We also can further our concerns and those of our allies by assisting the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, and the other new states to reduce dramatically the military burden on their societies, further reduce their forces, convert excess military industries to civilian production, assist efforts to dismantle and dispose of nuclear weapons safely and maintain firm command and control over those that remain, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and the other new states will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidations and demilitarization by freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success.

At the same time, as we work to strengthen democracy, we must consider the possibility that undemocratic regimes could emerge in some of the new states and seek to remilitarize their policies and societies. Our challenge and that of our allies is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or weaken the chances of successful reform. Overall, we strengthen the hand of democracy if our opposition to aggression is clear and there is a common understanding that the potential remains for strong collective response to aggression.

## **East Asia/Pacific**

East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost sixteen percent of the world economy; China alone holds a quarter of the world's population. U.S. two-way trade with the region stands at \$310 billion, approximately one third more than the total of our two-way trade with Europe. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, nuclear and conventional. The area contains either within it or on its periphery many of the largest armies in the world, including those of Russia, China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam.

To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain a significant military presence in the area, which even before current reductions in Asia represented only a small proportion of U.S. forces worldwide. We must maintain sufficient forward deployed forces and power projection capability to reassure our regional allies and friends, to preclude destabilizing military rivalries, to secure freedom of the seas, to deter threats to our key political and economic interests, and to preclude any hostile power from attempting to dominate the region. A strong U.S. military position, welcomed by leaders throughout the region, promotes conditions conducive to realization of objectives we share: democratization, protection of human rights, peaceful political change, and the spread of market economies and prosperity. Our forces in the region also support other of our U.S. security objectives, as recently demonstrated by the reliance on Pacific military facilities and forces to help project power into the Persian Gulf.

We must work to preserve our vigorous security alliances, especially with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. We should continue to encourage Japan and South Korea in particular to assume greater responsibility sharing, urging both to increase prudently their defensive capabilities to deal with threats and responsibilities they face and to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward deployed forces that contribute to their security. Japanese contributions in securing maritime approaches is one example. We also should persist in efforts to ensure an equitable, two-way flow of technology in our security cooperation with advanced allies such as Japan. We must plan to continue to safeguard critical sea lines of communications linking us to our allies and trading partners.

As our Pacific friends and allies are assuming greater responsibility for their defense, we can restructure our forces and reduce the number of ground and support forces forward deployed there. An appropriate framework for adjustments to our forward-deployed forces in the region is outlined in the East Asia Strategy Initiative as reported to Congress. In Phase I of our planned withdrawals more than 25,000 troops were withdrawn from bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. Plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. In time we should look to implement Phases II and III of the East Asia Strategy Initiative, with the objective of keeping substantial forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

Despite recent positive trends toward political liberalization and market-oriented economic reforms, the East Asia and Pacific region continues to be burdened by several legacies of the Cold War. the Soviet annexation of the Northern Territories of Japan, the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the civil war in Cambodia. The end of Communism in Europe is likely to bring pressure on remaining Communist regimes with unknown consequences for regional stability. We should continue to advance our relations with China on a realistic basis but also should ensure that Taiwan has the armaments needed to defend itself as provided by the Taiwan Relations Act, while taking into account the August 1982 Communiqué with China on Taiwan arms sales. We should work to curtail proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to advance democracy, freedom, and human rights in the countries of the region that lack them.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Although we have begun some reductions in our forces as part of shifting greater responsibility to our ally, we must maintain sufficient military capabilities together with the Republic of Korea to deter aggression by the North or to defeat it should deterrence fail. Our overall objective with regard to the Korean peninsula should remain to support its

peaceful unification on terms acceptable to the Korean people which foster democracy, freedom, and observance of human rights.

The emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development. ASEAN's population of 320 million is almost twice that of Japan and Korea combined. Southeast Asia is a region of increasing economic strength. By the end of the century, the combined ASEAN economies are forecasted to reach \$800 billion, over \$100 billion larger than China's. The United States shares an interest with the ASEAN countries in precluding Southeast Asia from becoming an area of strategic competition among regional powers.

With regard to U.S. bases in Southeast Asia, we have withdrawn our forces from the Philippines, consistent with the desires of the Philippine government. At the same time, we have sought to broaden our network of access agreements similar to the recently concluded Singapore access memorandum in lieu of permanent bases throughout Southeast Asia. These kinds of agreements will facilitate bilateral training, exercises, and interoperability, thereby enhancing our ability to work with allies and friends in crisis.

The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) alliance relationship remains an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended because of New Zealand's failure to live up to its alliance obligations. Our goal should remain to strengthen our partnership with Australia and work to remove obstacles to reintegrating New Zealand as a full partner in ANZUS.

As is the case in other regions, proliferation remains a central concern in Asia. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures that enhance stability. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

## **The Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia**

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, we should seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's important sources of oil. We should strive to encourage a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security. Some near-term dangers are alleviated with the defeat of Iraqi forces, but we must recognize that regional dynamics can change and a rejuvenated Iraq or a rearmed Iran could move in this decade to dominate the Gulf and its resources. We must remain prepared to act decisively in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region as we did in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm if our vital interests there are threatened anew. We also must be prepared to counter the terrorism, insurgency, and subversion that adversaries may use to threaten governments supportive of U.S. security interests.

The Gulf War has greatly enhanced our security relations in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- cooperation in combat, logistical support, and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.

To discourage the rise of a challenger hostile to our interests in the region, we must maintain a level of forward military presence adequate to reassure our friends and deter aggressors and present a credible crisis response capability. In consultation with our regional friends, we should increase our presence compared to the pre-Gulf War period. We will want to have the capability to return forces quickly to the region should that ever be necessary. We also should strengthen our bilateral security ties and encourage active regional collective defense.

We can strengthen stability throughout the region by sustaining and improving the self-defense capabilities of our regional friends. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and

U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to stability, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel

We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military and commercial sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We should tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

We should build on existing bilateral ties and negotiate needed agreements to enhance military access and prepositioning arrangements and other types of defense cooperation. These protocols will strengthen and broaden the individual and collective defense of friendly states.

The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We should continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons and reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles. We also should continue to work with leading suppliers of conventional weapons to the region (as called for in President Bush's 1991 Middle East arms control initiative) to prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

We should seek to maintain constructive, cooperative relations with India and Pakistan, strive to moderate tensions between them, and endeavor to eliminate nuclear arms programs on the subcontinent. In this regard, we should work in South Asia as elsewhere to have all countries adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism complicate our relations with regional countries. The Department should continue to contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. agencies in the region.

## **Latin America and the Caribbean**

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States seeks to sustain the extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy should remain assisting democratic consolidation and the efforts of the democratic nations in the region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgency and terrorism. In addition, the United States must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

Cuba poses an area of special concern for the United States. The end of Warsaw Pact subsidies has added to Cuba's economic decline. Over the near- to mid-term, Cuba's tenuous internal situation and its disproportionately large military could generate new challenges to U.S. policy, particularly because Castro retains the hostile intent that has for decades sought to undermine democratic progress in Central and South America.

The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we should seek the continued successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also should seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we should seek to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

The small island-states of the eastern Caribbean remain vulnerable to destabilization. Assistance in economic development is key, but we also should explore ways of strengthening the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System to strengthen democracy in these nations.

Following implementation of the Panama Canal treaty, we will have no permanent bases on the Latin America mainland. The general trend toward democratization and peace in Latin America and the dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba are long-sought developments. Nonetheless, potential regional problems remain, including the potential for instability in Cuba and elsewhere, and the continuing challenge of stopping trafficking in illegal drugs from this region.

Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our counterdrug programs in the region must focus on stemming the flow of drugs by attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the United States.

## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa has made encouraging progress toward democratization and economic liberalization. While seeking to facilitate these trends wherever possible, our continuing military role should be to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens, including undertaking noncombatant evacuation operations when necessary; alleviating disaster and distress with humanitarian assistance; strengthening the security, stability, and economic development of friendly states and supporting their democratic development and extending support to international peacekeeping efforts. Our commitment to alleviating distress can be seen particularly in our role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, striving to create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian relief operations. Out of the turmoil in South Africa we hope to see emerge a fully representative government still friendly to the United States and supportive of Western interests in the area.

## CONCLUSION

We must preserve the extraordinary environment that has emerged from the challenges of the Cold War -- an environment within which the values of freedom that we and our principal allies hold dear can flourish. We can secure and extend the remarkable democratic "zone of peace" that we and our allies now enjoy, preclude threats, and guard our national interests.

The Gulf War is a vivid reminder that we cannot be sure when or where the next conflict will arise. In early 1990, many said there were no threats left because of the Soviet commitment to withdraw from Eastern Europe; very few expected that we would be at war within a year. The experience of the past century is replete with instances in which enormous strategic changes often arose unexpectedly in the course of a few years or even less. This is not a lesson that we should have to keep learning anew.

As we reshape America's military and reduce its size, we must be careful that we do so in accordance with a defense strategy and a plan that will preserve the integrity of the military capability that we have so carefully built. If we choose wisely today, we can do well something America has always done badly before --we can draw down our military force at a responsible rate that will not end up endangering our security. The new Regional Defense Strategy has set a course to ensure our ability to deal with potential threats and shape the environment in ways favorable to our security.

(Signed)

Dick Cheney