The NPT,
Israel and Nuclear Exceptionalism
By
Binoy Kampmark
February 18, 2015 "ICH"
- Wither the bomb – as a legal problem. Ever
since its inception as a weapon of war,
atomic, and subsequently nuclear weaponry,
have become the totemic reminders that
sovereignty lie in their acquisition. Not
having them poses insecurity; acquiring them
grants the illusion of safety while pushing
the globe towards greater prospects of
immolation.
The Nuclear Weapons
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into
force in 1970, was the juggling result of
this dilemma. The question that dogs the
entire treaty is that of power: where does
it lie? Non-nuclear powers are discouraged
from acquiring a nuclear weapons potential,
though not a civilian potential – indeed,
they are encouraged to receive technology
for peaceful purposes “on a
non-discriminatory basis” at a cheap price.
Nuclear weapons powers,
however, are merely required to pay lip
service to such misty-eyed visions of a
world without nuclear weapons, while happily
engaging in that euphemistic word termed “modernisation”.
Article Six, a vague provision at best,
makes the five nuclear states “undertake to
pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective means relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date.”
Disarmament, in the scheme of things,
becomes utopia.
In other words, the NPT is
a club of skewed membership with poor
credentials, despite the note from the
United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs calling it significant for having
more signatories than “any other arms
limitation and disarmament agreement”. [1]
Analysts like Fred Kaplan argue that the NPT
did prevent the nuclear club from swelling –
a prediction of 25-30 countries having such
weapons is deemed a more terrifying prospect
than having the addition of four or so more
powers. [2] Of course, the underlying
rationale of the NPT was precisely that:
keeping the club exclusive.
But it has been shown over
the years of its operation that the NPT is a
legal creature with vast, lumbering
deficiencies. The supply of technology to
produce “peaceful” nuclear energy can just
as well be used to create nuclear weaponry –
a point emphasised by a thriving nuclear
black market, and the easy means by which
uranium can be enriched outside the scrutiny
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Countries like North Korea have realised
such weaknesses, abrogating its commitment
to the regime by employing Article 10. But
the system justifies its own abuses, making
non-nuclear weapons states compliant by
allowing IAEA inspection.
Then come the gentleman’s
club of nuclear powers – the ones who came
before the others and script a tune they
don’t necessarily march to. The treaty
prohibits the nuclear club powers, under
Article 1, from providing materials,
technology and incidental material that
would be used for making nuclear weapons.
The nuclear weapon states are also not to
“assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.”
In reality, this nuclear
club continues to create dispensations and
mark out areas of exception. Over time,
countries have received nuclear technology
in violation of signatory undertakings. The
supposed limitations imposed by the NPT on
non-nuclear weapons states have been deemed
insufficient.
But one such state takes
the mantle when it comes to nuclear
exceptionalism. Israel has deemed it wise
not to sign the NPT, thereby evading the
prying eyes of the IAEA. It prefers the
state of ambiguity that surrounds its
weapons, while insisting that other states
not undertake a nuclear weapons program. In
December, former speaker of the Knesset,
Avraham Burg, decided to wade into dangerous
waters by challenging this policy of
ambiguity as “outdated and childish,”
calling for a “regional dialogue, including
with Iran”. He was met by accusations of
treason by the Legal Forum for the Land of
Israel. [3]
Nuclear countries have
also capitalised on this position, while
insisting that Israel “become a state party
to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
[4] As far back as January 5, 1968, National
Security Advisor Walt Rostow expressed the
view to President Lyndon Johnson that Israel
would, eventually, sign the NPT. [5] But it
was as early as 1966 that the CIA realised
that Israel has acquired nuclear capability.
Technology has been
supplied to Israel, despite an official
position by Washington that it would be
“unalterably opposed to Israel’s acquiring
of nuclear weapons.” [6] That, in addition
to traditional industrial espionage
undertaken by the spy ring Lakam, made
acquiring the nuclear weapons program a
matter of course, to be undertaken even in
defiance of its close ally’s position.
As a member of the nuclear
club, the United States is on record as
having featured in its nuclear program.
Initially, it was deemed unwitting – the
supply of a 5-magawatt (thermal) research
reactor at Nahal Soreq; the supply of heavy
water to the Dimona reactor in 1963. France,
a point noted in Pierre Pean’s Les duex
bombes (1982), did even more,
kick-starting the Dimona project and
revealing the role of French technicians
behind creating a plutonium extraction plant
at the same site. [7]
In a declassified report
by the US Department of Defence, Critical
Technology Assessment in Israel and NATO
Nations (April 1987), the schizophrenic
nature of US weapons policy towards Israel
was revealed. It was acknowledged that
Israel was “developing the kind of codes
which will enable them to make hydrogen
bombs. That is, codes which detail fission
and fusion processes on a microscopic and
macroscopic level.” [8] (The technical crew
did, however, suggest Israel had some
catching up to do.) Furthermore, “The SOREQ
and the Dimona/Beer [sic] Sheva facilities
are the equivalent of our Los Alamos,
Lawrence Livermore and Oak Ridge National
Laboratories.” Ideas on various technologies
are noted, including the use of various
types of detonator codes.
Roger Mattson, formerly of
the Atomic Energy Commission’s staff, found
the “degree of cooperation on specialised
war making devices between Israel and the
US” striking. European powers, and their
role behind the Israeli defence complex, are
also noted.
Grant Smith, who initiated
the Freedom of Information request for the
report, has actively argued that the
Pentagon proved coy about its knowledge and
involvement with the Israeli defence
industry, burying it “in violation of the
Symington and Glenn amendments, costing
taxpayers $86 billion” (RT, Feb 13).
As director of the
Washington think tank Institute for
Research: Middle Eastern Policy, Smith has
long argued that violations have taken place
of the Symington Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 prohibiting US
foreign aid to countries found trafficking
in nuclear enrichment equipment or
technology, and the Glenn Amendment of 1977,
which demanded an end of US foreign aid to
countries importing nuclear reprocessing
technology.
Certain breaches of the
international regime on non-proliferation,
in other words, are tolerated. Israel
remains the grandest of security exceptions
– or ambiguities – free of signing the NPT,
obviating the need to deal with the IAEA,
and a catalyst, and recipient, of nuclear
weapons technology.
1.
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml
2.
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
war_stories/2005/05/the_real_nuclear_option.html
3.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/avraham-burg-panned-for-breaking-nuclear-ambiguity/
4.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/truth-israels-secret-nuclear-arsenal
5.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/02-01.htm
6.
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/01-01.htm
7.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/nuke.html
8.
http://www.courthousenews.com/2015/02/12/nuc%20report.pdf
Dr. Binoy Kampmark
lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne and
was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn
College, Cambridge. Email:
bkampmark@gmail.com
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