How Our Drone Policy Backfires
We keep killing terrorist leaders yet terrorism only grows. Isn't it time to
re-evaluate?
By Andrew Cockburn
May 14, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "USA
Today" - According to
Iraqi Prime Minister
Haidar al-Abadi and other sources, the coalition fighting ISIL has scored a
notable victory. Hit by an airstrike on his convoy and badly
wounded two months ago,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-styled "caliph" of the Islamic State,
now no longer has operational control of the terrorist group.
Al-Baghdadi
has been No. 1 on a U.S. kill list of about two dozen senior ISIL leaders
drawn up after the group's stunning conquests in Iraq and
Syria
last year. He thus joined a long line of terrorist leaders in that spot,
going back to
Osama bin Laden.
In 2001, then-President
George W. Bush said the al-Qaeda leader was wanted "dead
or alive," and the hunt has been on for leading terrorists ever since.
There have been many successes:
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the fearsome commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq; his
successor
Abu
Ayyub al-Masri;
Bin Laden himself, of course; along with many of the "core
al-Qaeda" hiding out in Pakistan.
Secretary of State John Kerry
announced in January that we have "eliminated" 50% of ISIL's "top command."
With a success rate like that, we should pretty much have won
the war on terror by now.
Except that in many ways, things have gotten worse. For
example, since the ISIL leader was put out of action, reportedly with severe
spinal injuries, back in March, his group has conquered or assaulted large
swathes of
western Syria, the Iraqi city of
Ramadi and Iraq's major oil refinery at
Baiji. It has also gained fresh adherents in
Yemen,
Libya and even
Texas. In the same way, al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIL's
forerunner that fought
U.S. forces, reached its greatest effectiveness after Zarqawi was killed.
How could this be? How could the loss of capable and
charismatic leaders not degrade their group? The answer may lie in a
little-known study carried out in Iraq in 2007 by a small semisecret unit, the
Combat Operations Intelligence Center. Targeting "high value individuals" was
the principal U.S. strategy in Iraq, and the COIC analysts were interested to
see whether it worked. They took the list of 200 "IED cell leaders" eliminated
between June and October 2007 and looked at the results.
They were dramatic, in the worst way. Removing the leaders did
not lead to a decline of violence in the area where they had operated. Instead,
attacks on U.S. and coalition forces went up, sharply. After three days, they
were up by an average of 40%. Five days later, they were still running 20% above
"normal" (defined as the average for the pre-strike 30 days). After 10 days,
they had fallen back to the pre-strike level, and the situation was as bad as
before.
The reason for this unexpected result, so the analysts
concluded, was that the dead leader was almost always replaced immediately. The
new man would be eager to "show his bones," by making a big impression as well
as to avenge his predecessor (often a relative) as well as learning from the
mistakes that had gotten him killed.
In fact, this startling result should not have come as too
much of a surprise. In the 1990s, the
Drug Enforcement Administration had adopted the "kingpin
strategy" — targeting the kingpins heading up the infamous Colombian cocaine
cartels. On paper, and in the headlines, it was a great success.
Pablo Escobar, leader of the infamous
Medellin cartel, was hunted down and killed in December 1993. Twenty
months later, the chiefs of the equally powerful
Cali cartel were captured and jailed. Other triumphs
followed, all of which should have at least put a crimp on the drug trade.
It had the opposite effect. Cocaine supplies to the U.S.
actually
increased, as evidenced by
lower prices — thanks to the kingpin strategy. Removal of the cartel leaders
had opened the way for new competitors, who pushed for market share and competed
with increased supplies and lower prices.
Back in Iraq in 2007, the intelligence analysts briefed their
findings to the high command with the concluding comment, "Our principal
strategy … is counterproductive and needs to be re-evaluated."
Maybe it's time we took those words to heart.
Andrew Cockburn is the author of the newly published
Kill Chain: The Rise of the High Tech Assassins. He is the Washington
editor of Harper's Magazine.