The Secret Of ISIL’s Appeal
It's not about what the group is for but who it's against
By Musa al-Gharbi
June 18, 2015 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Al
Jazeera" -
It is often remarked that
proponents of the prevailing international order, despite their
rhetoric about freedom and democracy, eagerly support dictators,
warlords and other autocrats in order to preserve the status
quo. However, this tendency is
no less pronounced in opponents of the system. For example,
during the Cold War,
Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro inspired many
Westerners in leftist movements, particularly young people, some
of whom carried out
campaigns of domestic terrorism in order to provoke
revolution.The Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) similarly aspires to a new form of social
arrangement. In this
post-Occupy period, when no one else seems to have the
willingness or ability to meaningfully fight the system, ISIL
appears to many youths as virtually the only actor interested in
and capable of
radical societal reforms. Understanding this source of
ISIL’s appeal is critical to countering its narratives,
undermining its recruitment and ultimately defeating the group.
Beyond brainwashing
ISIL’s recruits are generally
not stupid, ignorant or naive, nor are they
religious zealots, nor are they somehow unable to resist
social media messaging. It is comforting to write off ISIL
supporters as deranged or
brainwashed because it helps distract from the role the
anti-ISIL coalition’s members played in
creating and perpetuating the conditions under which ISIL
could emerge and flourish, but the extensive post-9/11 body of
research on terrorism clearly shows that, regardless of how a
campaign may be framed, the
primary reason people support terrorism is to achieve
political goals.For example, it is
widely assumed that most suicide bombers are uneducated,
mentally ill or otherwise cognitively deficient. Or that
would-be martyrs are simply nihilistic (often from having few
socioeconomic prospects) or are narcissists eager for notoriety.
It turns out that those cases are the
exception rather than the rule: Suicide bombers tend to be
wealthier and better educated than most in their societies.
In fact, it is their deeper understanding of societal problems
that often impels their activism. And rather than sociopathic,
they tend to be
prosocial, idealistic and altruistic, driven by
compassion and a sense of moral outrage.
Millennials tend to be especially
globally conscious and passionate about making a difference.
However, they are also
intensely skeptical about societal institutions and whether
the system can bring about
sufficient change on pressing issues. This is the main
source of
ISIL’s allure among youths.
Sympathizers are well aware of the atrocities
committed by ISIL — news of which is disseminated widely by the
group itself, in part
to lure unpopular foreign actors into its theater of war. By
taking the bait, the Western-led coalition has allowed ISIL to
position itself as a resistance organization against a
U.S.-dominated unipolar world order, a bulwark against meddling
in Middle Eastern and Muslim affairs by former colonial and
imperial powers and the repression of Western-backed autocrats.
ISIL’s
recruitment has surged as a result.
Most insurgencies are driven
initially and primarily by local concerns, in
particular
poor governance or
foreign intervention or occupation. These indigenous
uprisings are often
framed in terms of a larger ideological struggle by
transnational groups or external state actors with a
stake in the outcome, albeit typically after they are
already well underway. Rebels, in turn, tend to embrace
imposed narratives if they believe it will help garner
international attention and support for their cause.
A rapid succession of uprisings in the
Middle East and North Africa marked 2011 — collectively
referred to as the Arab Spring. In the beginning, there
was
widespread optimism that these revolts would
delegitimize the terrorist narrative by addressing
endemic state oppression, violence and corruption across
the region. Instead,
it was the civil Islamists who were devastated as
they were overcome by violent counterrevolutionary
forces. Meanwhile, after some initial halfhearted
support for the uprisings, outside powers came to be
more concerned with maintaining and restoring the
long-standing status quo, embracing autocrats once more.
But most Arabs were not nearly as keen
to turn the clock back. And given that it appears
impossible to achieve meaningful political reforms
through
democratic processes or diplomatic coercion, ISIL is
increasingly seen as the best, if not the only, conduit
to redress local grievances. The group will not be
defeated as long as this state of affairs prevails. And
military solutions are likely to make the situation
worse: Insofar as campaigns are spearheaded by Western
powers and regional autocrats, any
loss of territory or
attrition of ISIL forces will continue to be offset
by increased popular support.
A way out
Coalition members are holding “haqqathons”
(haqq is Arabic for “truth”) to counter ISIL’s
social media outreach, establishing
deradicalization camps and carrying out military
ventures to contain and diminish ISIL’s capabilities.
But these methods do not resolve the underlying causes
of ISIL’s appeal. Precisely, they are attempts to
mitigate the threat without making any significant
geopolitical, social or economic concessions and
reforms. Ultimately,
this is a losing proposition. As long as the United
States and its allies continue to champion the global
status quo — along with the oppression,
exploitation and injustice that entails — the appeal
of resistance actors such as ISIL will
persist or even grow.But it
doesn’t have to be this way. The U.S. has an
unparalleled
capacity to reform international systems and
institutions. It could counter ISIL’s narrative by
simply changing the way it does business in the Middle
East. If the U.S. demonstrated a willingness and
commitment to revising its relationship with the region,
the appeal of these resistance agents and the urgency of
their cause would diminish.
These reforms
need not require imperialistic actions such as
invasions, occupations and regime change; the current
crisis is in part a result of previous attempts to
impose and universalize liberalism. Instead, the
U.S. must stop its
insistence on failed strategies and acknowledge not
only the
immense harm wrought by its Middle East policies but
also the extent to which Washington’s actions have
profoundly contradicted its lofty rhetoric and ideals.
As a show of good faith, the U.S.
should cut off all funding for substate and nonstate
proxies and end unconditional military and geopolitical
assistance for Middle Eastern tyrants and Israel.
Perhaps most important, the U.S. should cease
picking sides and intervening in conflicts in which
there are no
direct and urgent national security imperatives —
although even most of these challenges can be
well managed through domestic security measures to
repel any immediate threats and by leveraging diplomatic
and humanitarian measures or policy reforms to address
underlying issues.
This approach would offer much higher
dividends for a much lower cost. And Washington could,
in principle, deploy this strategy more or less
immediately and unilaterally. But unfortunately,
most U.S. politicians appear committed to escalating
the
ill-fated military campaign instead.
Musa al-Gharbi is a senior
fellow with the Southwest Initiative for the Study of
Middle East Conflicts (SISMEC).
© 2015 Al Jazeera America, LLC. All rights
reserved.
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